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abstract
In a Scandinavian perspective; the family and the individual have changed place 
during the 20th century. Today, the law takes its starting point in the individual 
– not in the family. A consequence of this development is that it no longer is 
legally possible to relate the good family to a particular societal institution. 
Marriage as an institution has been individualized and the goodness of the 
family has to relate to the well being of the individuals instead. This article 
shows that within this historical development the private-public law divide 
has not been seriously challenged. The inconsistencies stemming from it are 
demonstrated and it is shown  how they imply a legal design more preoccupied 
with traditional divisions of power and positions than with an interest in the 
reality of the people it is aimed at. In the article it is argued from within the 
best interest principle that the historical development necessitates a re-thinking 
of the distinction between child welfare law and family law. It shows how 
the distinction is nationally and institutionally embedded. Further, that the 
distinction has only been superficially addressed by the crc committee.
Key words: Private/public law distinction, child protection, child welfare, best 
interest of the child, national authorities, family, crc, individualization.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we describe the development of new perceptions of parent-
hood, family and child welfare in family law and child welfare law with 
a view to the workings of respective national authorities. The purpose 
is to discuss implications of the development for the relation between 
the two legal fields and authorities, and to ask to what degree the legal 
framework is coherent with changed perceptions. The article focuses on 
Danish law, but parallels will be drawn to Sweden and Norway to set up 
a Scandinavian context.
The starting point is a common situation of today: A child hav-
ing problems, related to the parents’ serious disagreements about the 
upbringing of the child, the typical situation being that the parents 
have separated or divorced. We see the situation as framed by two 
legally divided and different understandings; that of private law on the 
one hand and of public law on the other. Thus, the private-public law 
divide is generalized and used as an analytical tool in this paper, since it 
is a core feature of the legal systems of the Scandinavian countries even 
though the divide has been approached differently in each country, and 
although the general relevance and reality of this divide is disputed. It is 
still there. The private law understanding of the situation is covered by 
family law, dealing with questions of parental responsibility, residence 
and contact. In family law, a case is typically initiated by one of the 
parents, and the involvement of the authorities is defined by the par-
ents’ conflict. The competent authority addresses the issue of conflict 
between the parents, and there is no obligation to supervise whether a 
decision based on the best interests of the child continues to be so. This 
is different from the public law understanding of the situation – here it 
is covered by child welfare law. In child welfare law, the parents are not in 
control of the case as in family law. The public authorities are involved 
in the family as defined from a more holistic child welfare perspective. 
They are obliged to investigate the situation and to supervise the family 
if they make a decision in order to support the child’s welfare. 
Our approach is to first outline the general, international develop-
ments in the direction of individualization of the family that bear upon 
the respective legal fields, and on this background to describe current 
Danish family law and child welfare law, by drawing on the historical 
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development of law and authorities with a view to the private/public 
distinction. Then we review current law and its coherence, discuss the 
relevance of the distinction, and tentatively draw a Scandinavian paral-
lel. Finally, we discuss the developments with a view to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (crc), since the notion of »the best interests 
of the child« is a core value in both family law and welfare law.
Through this analysis, we find a number of inconsistences and 
impracticalities related to the divide and leading to implications for 
families, children and authorities. Additionally, we find that these 
implications cannot reasonably be justified by considerations to uphold 
a traditional legal distinction but rather ought to lead to a more basic 
re-thinking of the two systems. Such a re-thinking necessarily would 
have to take seriously the changed perceptions and conditions of fami-
lies, parenthood and children and to take a child and family oriented 
perspective. As such, re-thinking the legal regulation poses the question 
whether family and welfare law and authorities should be more—or 
completely—united? We will not answer this question, but confine 
ourselves to draw attention to the fact that it can and should be posed. 
Legal distinctions are not natural or self-evident. They can be changed.
2. The influence of the individualization of family
The Nordic family law reforms in the beginning of the 20th century 
represented society’s legal adaptation to the industrialization and the 
new working and living patterns. Industrialization had in some respect 
produced dehumanizing working conditions which the family was to 
compensate for and had led to new family patterns of more wage earn-
ers. The understanding of the family, embedded in the reforms, was a 
nuclear family, framed by marriage with a housewife and a wage earner.1 
The housewife was meant to turn new knowledge into welfare, and to 
create a nice home, as well as to lift the family and society as a whole out 
of poverty. This was a new, modern sense of family and motherhood.2 If 
the husband failed to earn enough money, the housewife was expected 
1 Bentzon, V. (1920).
2 Schmidt, L.-H.  and J. E. Kristensen (1986), chapter 6, Projekt husmoder.
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to work outside the home since both spouses were obliged to support 
the family.3 Although the reforms therefore led to new legal formats, 
such as joint custody, common maintenance obligations and the liber-
alization of divorce, the family was still considered a pre-existing entity; 
a central pillar of society, uniquely placed as the bearer of morals. Thus, 
marriage was still seen as the legal category of family; marriage was the 
societal institution understood as good, and therefore it was good that 
the spouses had joint custody and common obligations of maintenance. 
The liberalization of divorce was also partly framed as a matter of a 
higher degree of equality between spouses within this understanding.4 
In theory, the intimacy of family life still involved the need and natural-
ness of a high moral life, and it was not the aim of the reforms that the 
state5 should regulate or individualize family life. The aim was only to 
regulate the framework of the family — parental authority, maintenance 
and tentatively limited contact. The framework corresponded to this 
understanding of marriage as the right and harmonious family as a pre-
existing entity, and divorced or unmarried parents were delegated sole 
parental authority and thus legally not in conflict with the other parent. 
Thus, unmarried parents deviated from the ideal of marriage, and dis-
solution of marriage was understood as a change in the parents’ societal 
status, entailing a necessity to reorganize the child’s legal position to its 
parents.6 
In reality, the reforms led to an increase of state intervention in civil 
society focusing on two issues which were crucial also on the public law 
agenda - maintenance and children in poor living conditions.7 And in 
reality, the reforms implied moving from marriage as the legal frame-
work of the family to state interest in the individual family member, 
be it the individual parent(s) or the child. One reason for this external, 
3 See an analysis of the spouses equal obligations; Bersbo, Z (2010).
4 On the liberalization of divorce, see Kronborg, A and I. L. Svendsen (2012).
5 The term state is used in a broad sense including all public authorities such as courts, 
municipalities and state administration. The term State Administration refers specifi-
cally to the authority Statsforvaltningen.
6 In Danish law agreement or decision on custody was from 2001 no longer a condition 
to divorce.
7 On the connection between the family law reform and the development of the wel-
fare state, see Melby, K. et.al. (2001).
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individualizing effect on the family was that it became less necessary for 
the individual person to uphold a miserable marriage - and sometimes 
even irresponsible. Another reason was that the equality within the 
family unit over time made it difficult to uphold the traditional, differ-
ent legal positions of men and women in public law such as regards the 
rights to citizenship, taxing benefits and differences in wages. This was 
increasingly seen as discrimination; as an infringement of individual 
rights. 
The globalization and rise of the competitive state in the end of the 
century entailed further individualization of family and parenthood 
as well as an increase of state intervention in the family.8 Today, the 
individual person has taken the family’s place as the pre-existing unit of 
society. In this move same sex couples have been included in normality. 
Also divided parenthood with two homes of the child has been included 
together with single mothers given fertility treatment in public clin-
ics. The individual, not the family, is the entity which the regulation is 
directed at. Family is an attribute of the person and part of his or her 
self-realization/creation as a parent or a partner.9 Dissolving a marriage 
or a partnership is not seen as a break-down, but rather as a new begin-
ning – as a possibility of entering into new relations with respect of the 
children’s perspective. 
The individual duties and rights in today’s society can be understood 
on the background of this new position of family and individual. In a 
sense they have changed place. Today, the individual comes first – then 
the family. A consequence of this development is that it is no longer 
possible to relate the good family to a particular societal institution. 
Marriage as an institution has been individualized and the goodness of 
family has to be related to the individuals instead.10
Thus, the image of the child as a part of a family entity has been emu-
lated by the image of the child as a bearer of rights,11 including a right to 
8 On state intervention in the family, see Egelund, T (1997) Bryderup, I (2005) og 
Ebsen, F. (2007).
9 See on the époque of self-creation; Schmidt, L.-H. (1999).
10 In Danish law there is almost no legal relationship between marriage and parent-
hood.
11 Mattsson, T. (2008), Warming, H, (2011) Gilbert, Parton and Skivenes (2011).
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two parents, and it is considered in the best interests of the child if the 
parents reach a decision on the future of the child, if necessary guided 
by the authorities. This implies a move from an ideal of harmony and 
stability in the perception of family and parenthood to a perception 
of dynamics and conflict because the individual right-holders are the 
holders of harmony as well as conflicts and they are free to make choices, 
and they may not agree. As for the parents, caregiving to a larger extent 
therefore involves guidance from the state. As for the child, the develop-
ment puts it in a more direct relation to the state since there is less fam-
ily uncovered by the state to mediate parental conflict, allowing for the 
child to be continuously moved from one home to another. Thus, the 
child’s right to two parents is not only a substitute for the former mar-
riage with the inclusion of same sex couples and parents living apart. 
The individualization has further implications because the individual 
right-holders may be in conflict that can harm of the child.12
In this way, the historical development has led to new contexts and 
perceptions of children, family and parenthood, one central change 
being the shift from an ideal of marriage and harmony to individual 
rights and child welfare. Due to this individualization, the families 
involved in the private and the public law system are generally and 
potentially the same. However, the divide between family law and wel-
fare law is more or less upheld in its traditional form.
3. Family law authorities and procedures
Family law has adapted to the development by installing and emphasiz-
ing procedural regimes with two paths—one of agreement and one of 
decision-making. Thus, the development of an individualized percep-
tion of parenthood has involved a change in the interplay between 
procedural and substantive family law. The procedural regime has been 
developed with the ideal of co-operating parents. The Danish proce-
dures concerning parental authority, residence or contact—separately or 
as a non-mandatory part of the divorce procedure—involve two types of 
authorities, the State Administration and the court system. The former 
12 On conflict as normality; Raffnsøe, S. and O. K. Pedersen (1993).
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takes the role of gate-keeper of access to the court system, the role of 
which has been gradually emasculated during the last decades with the 
aim of promoting parental co-operation and settlement.13
The parallel system was rearranged in a reform that came into 
force in 2007 which was part of a larger reform reducing the number 
of municipalities and re-arranging the regional level between state 
and municipality, by turning the former 14 counties, led by regional 
politicians, into 5 administrative regions.14 The number of regional state 
administrations was also reduced from fifteen to five. Later, in 2013, the 
State Administration has been centralised to one administration with 
regional offices.15 The main goal was to create larger units and reduce 
costs, increasing efficiency and expertise. The main feature of the reform 
in family law was to favour the administrative procedure above the 
court procedure. The two track system based on agreement (administra-
tive procedure) and decision (court procedure), providing a choice for 
the parents, was abandoned in favour of the obligatory administrative 
entrance, designed to promote co-operation and settlement, reserving 
the court procedure for those unwilling or unable to fit the co-operation 
norm. In substantive law the main rule became joint custody and as a 
consequence residence as a legal concept was introduced. The residence 
parent is authorized to solely make decisions on »general daily care» 
(which according to the guidelines on contact includes the child’s right 
to an assessor in contact cases), care-institutions, national relocation, 
school psychologist, child counselling.16 The two track reform also 
implied a further development of the administrative procedural regime 
in respect of more differentiated procedures and separation of peda-
gogical efforts from legal decisions. The central supervision of the State 
Administration is carried out by use of contracts defining the yearly 
results of the State Administration which includes a minimum percent-
13 On this development, see Kronborg, A (2007).
14 Lov nr. 499 af 6. juni 2007 Forældreansvarsloven (Act on parental responsibility).
15 Lov nr. 157 af 16. maj 2013 om ændring af lov om regional statsforvaltning, lov om børnefor­
sørgelse, lov om ægteskabs indgåelse og opløsning og forskellige andre love som følge af ændret 
organisering af statsforvaltningerne.
16 Vejledning nr. 71 af 27.09 2012 om forældremyndighed og barnets bopæl (Guidelines on 
parental authority and residence of the child) Section 2.3.1. and Vejledning nr 9297 af 
25.06.2013 om samvær (Guidelines on contact) Section 21.3.2.
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age of the number of cases in which the parties should reach a settle-
ment.17 The loss of an individual right to bring your own case to the 
court was implemented without any public debate of the consequences 
of this new perception of the family law authorities, and there has been 
no later debate of this part of the reform. The changes are adaptive and 
interdependent in relation to the changes in the perception of parent-
hood. As such their rational basis and values such as welfare efficiency, 
cooperation and broad target groups, not based on categories in reality 
resemble those of welfare law, cf. below.
The State Administration is regulated in The Act on Parental 
Responsibility and in general public administrative law. The case work 
of the State Administration is understood as private law concerning 
the legal framework of parenthood, i.e. the child’s right to two parents. 
Thus, all cases with the State Administration are initiated by one of the 
parents, and the parents have the autonomy to withdraw the case. The 
right of a child aged 10 or older to »initiate» a question with the State 
Administration does not obligate the parents to participate, and cannot 
lead to a decision against the parents’ will.18 There is no review of an 
agreement concerning the allocation of parental authority (sole/joint), 
the child’s residence or contact. The State Administration offers various 
types of services, such as counselling, mediation and supervision of con-
tact designed to maximise settlement, participation and ensuring the 
child’s right to two parents. The State Administration can also institute 
a child expert investigation.19 These services are organized strictly with-
in a family law context, and typically without the involvement of the 
municipal child welfare authorities. The procedures are thus to a wide 
extent procedurally framed by the perception of parents as autonomous 
individuals, and in case of concerns with the child’s well-being, the 
procedural answer is to report to the municipal social welfare author-
ity as described below.20 To some extent child involvement is expected. 
17 The contracts of Statsforvaltningen, see http://www.statsforvaltningen.dk/site.
aspx?p=8573
18 Foraeldreansvarsloven section 35.
19 Foraeldreansvarsloven section 33.
20 See for instance the decision of the Central Board of Appeal of 7. February 2012, 
where contact between father and a 9 year old child was abrogated due to lack 
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However, child involvement in the case of the State Administration is 
accepted to take the form of asking the parents but may be a condition 
to the making of a decision—as opposed to the strict demands for direct 
child participation in child welfare cases, cf. below. Only if a case is not 
settled in the State Administration can it be submitted to court—if one 
of the parties asks for it.21 While there is no formal obligation for the 
parents to participate or allowing the child to participate to the case 
a lack of co-operation may become decisive for the ultimate decision, 
regardless of whether such decision is made by the State Administration 
(contact decision—temporary decisions on parental authority and resi-
dence) or the ordinary courts (parental authority and residence).22
Denmark has no general administrative appeal system for all admin-
istrative cases covering all legal topics. The State Administration’s deci-
sions can be appealed to the Division of Family Affairs of the National 
Appeals Board,23 which is a part of the Ministry of Integration and 
Social Affairs. Apart from the Board’s appeal function in these cases, the 
National Appeals Board also performs many other forms of administra-
tion and governing, such as statistical monitoring and evaluation of the 
administration, building of central databases, information campaigns, 
and it also take part in the preparatory legislative work and drafts the 
extensive guidelines in the field of family law.24
The local State Administration was developed during the period of 
autocracy from 1660—1849 and have continued also after the democ-
ratisation typically linked to the year the constitution was enacted 
(1849). It has consequently remained an important feature of Danish 
family law. As a parallel to the court’s ruling on divorce according to 
the Danish Code of 1683, a concession practice was developed by the 
King as head of the state, forming the normative basis for the above 
of cooperation from the mother, who was then reported to the municipality 
tfa2012.303, (ff2012.2011-7310-05174).
21 Foraeldreansvarsloven section 40.
22 Lack on co-operation may become decisive; see for example Vejledning om samvaer 
(guidelines on contact) section 4.4.
23 Ankestyrelsen.
24 The power to do so is contained in Foraeldreansvarsloven section 42.
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mentioned legislative reforms in Danish family law in the 1920s.25 
The reforms maintained the parallel court and administrative system, 
roughly speaking providing the administration with authority in case of 
agreement and the court in case of a dispute. This was not implemented 
without critic in the legal literature maintaining that matrimonial cases 
were in principle a judicial matter. Yet no criticism has been heard since 
the 1970s.26 In 1980, the government defended the state administra-
tion and it has not been challenged hereafter.27 In the government’s 
memorandum the main argument favouring the administrative system 
was that gathering all the cases in the ministry created uniformity, 
expertise and avoided the delay associated with the court system. The 
administrative system was characterized as easy, discrete and cheap. 
In these discussions, the establishment of a family court was rejected, 
one argument being the difficulty of qualifying the procedure as being 
judicial or administrative.28
The court system builds on the ordinary courts, regulated procedur-
ally in the Procedural Act.29 The court system is not specialised, and 
court decisions can be appealed to the high court as part of the common 
court system (court decisions may only be tried in full by the Supreme 
Court if special permission has been obtained from the Appeals 
Permission Board). As mentioned above, it is the general principle that 
court cases must be initiated by the State Administration. Only if a case 
is not settled, the State Administration may be requested by one of the 
parties to submit the case to court.30 Although the court system is not 
25 Andersen, E. (1956) pp. 251 ff.
26 Danielsen, S. (1989) p. 76.
27 ft 1979-80, sp 8779, see Danielsen, S (1989) p. 82.
28 Basse, E.M. (1976).
29 Retsplejeloven nr. 1008 af 24.10.2012 Consolidated Act on Procedures with later changes 
(specific regulation of the family procedures in Chapter 42).
30 In contact cases the administrative authority is solely competent to decide the dispute 
with the possibility of administrative appeal and a limited judicial review. The com-
petence of the court to decide contact in connection with a case on parental authority 
introduced in 2007 was removed again in 2012 as contact cases were considered to 
be unsuited for judicial decision making due to the »unlimited, detailed and change-
able» nature of such cases, Legislative proposal, L157 2011/2012 with comments, pp. 
15-16, Act No. 600 of 18.06.2012.
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specialised, a case on custody or residence in the court system differs 
from other civil procedures. The judge has a greater responsibility to 
investigate the best interests of the child. Practically speaking, the main 
content of this is that the judge may initiate a child expert investiga-
tion on the child’s situation and the parents’ capabilities.31 These child 
experts are private actors and have no relation to the municipalities or 
other state institutions. There are, however, guidelines regulating these 
investigations favouring the normative framework contained in the Act 
on Parental responsibility; the child’s right to two parents. Although 
most counselling and mediation is offered at the administrative level, 
the court can also offer the parents mediation32 and make use of child 
experts in court.33
The development in family law has changed the state’s involvement 
in the family. In traditional marriage law, the public interest was related 
to the matter of status of married, unmarried or divorced as framed 
by the divorce case. The earlier pre-defined entities of good and bad 
categories such as marital status, gender and sexual orientation that 
delineated the distinction between state sphere and private sphere have 
disappeared in favour of individual rights of the family members. The 
change came about through a changed perception of the family mem-
bers as autonomous individuals and the legal design was to go further 
in to the child’s living circumstances upholding the child’s and parent’s 
individual rights. Thus, the balance between private and public interests 
have changed in favor of the latter. And the development of individual 
rights—which is based on an understanding of the co-operating par-
ent as autonomous—simultaneously narrows the individual room for 
autonomy. One parent has to respect the other parent’s and child’s right 
which narrows the room for care arrangements. As such, autonomy 
leads to increased state involvement in the welfare of the individual. 
This increased state interest represents the adaptation of family law to 
common welfare rationales and as such make the relation to child wel-
fare law and the coherence of the legal frameworks relevant.
31 Retsplejeloven section 450 a-d.
32 Retsplejeloven chapter 27.
33 Retsplejeloven section 450 a.
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4. Child welfare law and procedures in Denmark
4.1. Current law and procedures
Both decision-making and execution of services and interventions 
pertaining to child welfare are the responsibilities of the 98 munici-
palities, who are also responsible in most other areas of public, 
social services.. The municipalities’ administration in social cases is 
regulated in the Social Services Act and in the Act on Legal Protection 
and Administration in Social Matters.34. The administration in social 
cases is strictly separated from the family law administration of the 
State Administration.35 When informed – for instance by the State 
Administration - of a child potentially in need, the municipality is 
obliged to investigate the situation.36 Recently, a range of new possibili-
ties and obligations have been added to the legislation, i.e. expanding 
and emphasizing the duty of officials and others to report on children 
in need, to systematically register reports in the municipalities, to 
interview children unsupervised by the parents, to establish »children 
houses» for investigation of cases of abuse, and to process sensitive 
information between different authorities37 Initiation of an investiga-
tion does not require parental consent, but this is recommended in the 
legal regulation. It is up to the municipality to initiate and carry out the 
investigation, but it can be ordered also by the National Appeals Board, 
if a municipality is found by the Board not to fulfill its obligations. An 
investigation procedure must cover a range of aspects concerning the 
child’s situation in respect of health, relationships, school attendance38 
etc., and must point at whether - and which - measures should be initi-
ated. Municipal decisions on this form of investigation and measures 
34 Lov om Retssikkerhed og Administration på det Sociale Område nr. 920 af 17.09.2012, 
(Consolidated Act). 
35 Based upon the principle of sector responsibility; »Sektoransvarlighedsprincippet», see 
for instance the report from the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman from 2005 (fou 
2005.427) https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=28853
36 Lov on social service, jf. Lovbekendtgørelse nr.1093 af 05.09.2013 (Consolidated act on 
social services) section 50. 
37 Lov nr 628 af 11.06.2010 (Barnets reform) og Lov nr. 496 af 21.05.2013 om ændring af lov om 
social service. (Beskyttelse af børn og unge mod overgreb m.v).
38 Lov nr. 1442 af 22.12.2004 (Anbringelsesreformen).
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can be appealed to the National Appeals Board. Individual, need-based 
measures are initiated by the municipality, who can also be ordered by 
the National Appeals Board to initiate these. In general, to offer services, 
parental consent is required from both custodial parents, notwithstand-
ing residency of the child. For some measures, a lack of parental consent 
means that they cannot be ordered at all, such as family treatment. 
Other measures can be issued by the municipalities without parental 
consent, such as assignment of a personal counsellor for a young person, 
and treatment, for example psychological of the young person if he or 
she consents.39 The municipality is competent also in the case of out of 
home placement and contact if the parental custodian(s) and the young 
person above the age of 15 consents. Decisions of a coercive nature, 
i.e., out-of-home placement, extension of placement and restrictions in 
access and contact, can be initiated without the consent of the parent(s) 
or the 15 year old. Such decisions are initiated by the municipality, but 
must be endorsed by special children and young persons’ committees. 
These committees are on the one hand located on the municipalities’ 
premises and administratively served by these, and on the other they 
are independent entities with the participation of two local politicians, 
two child experts, and a judge. Their decisions can be appealed to the 
National Appeals Board and further on to the city court. During the 
last years, the range of non-consensual measures has been expanded, 
opening up for refusal of parents’ permission to take home a child who 
has been placed out of home voluntarily when strong relationships have 
developed in the care giving environment, and for placement with a per-
spective of (forced) adoption. Individual, need-based measures whether 
with or without parental consent are executed by the municipalities, 
and must be accompanied by an action plan and individually supervised 
by the municipality every six months. Out of home placement with or 
without parental consent does not remove the parental authority of the 
parents,40 but the municipality has the authority to decide on questions 
relating to the child during placement, such as contact, education and 
39 Section 56.
40 Save for the (exceptional) situation of a forced adoption.
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health, preferably in cooperation with the parents. Thus, the actual 
influence of the parents is limited by the placement. 
4.2. The child welfare authorities—historically
Although Denmark has had legislation on orphaned and stray chil-
dren from the beginning of the 18th century,41 the first Danish law on 
children, the Children Act, did not come into force before 1905.42 The 
Act had been prepared by the Commission on state supervision of 
the upbringing of children, set up in 1893 as a response or follow-up 
on the child protection activities, organized by private, middle-class, 
religious organizations and to a certain extent in cooperation with 
public authorities throughout the 19th century.43 These activities were 
directed at poor families as a response to the developing socialist move-
ment and its attention at the conditions of the working class and its 
children. The aim was to save a large number of children from what was 
seen as immoral and depraved conditions by use of modern rational 
principles.44 Thus, it was the view that the state should take over more 
responsibility for the upbringing of children, which could no longer be 
regarded as a solely private responsibility. The Act made it possible to 
order supervision of parents, remove parental authority, and remove 
»morally deprived», abused and neglected children from the home. 
Particularly children of single, unmarried mothers were targeted. 
Decisions could not be left with the local authorities, due to the low 
educational level and questionable interests of these.45 Therefore, the 
public supervision of risky families and children were to be put into 
41 The factory laws from 1873 and 1901, limiting child labor, and the legislation from 
1888, entitling unmarried mothers to have their child support disbursed by the pov-
erty authorities in case the child’s father refuted payment of support. Considerations 
of how to ensure some level of general childhood conditions also lied behind the 
implementation of state subvention of private health insurance societies and the—
rather restrictive—regulation on poverty and on old age support in 1891–1893.
42 Lov nr. 72 af 14. April 1905 om Behandlingen av Forbryderiske og Forsømte  Barn og Unge 
(Act on the Treatment of Criminal and Neglected Children and Young Persons).
43 Ebsen, F. (2012).
44 Graversen, J. & L. Sejr (1990).
45 Ploug, N. et.al.(2004).
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practice by local custodian boards, independent of the municipalities, 
and a new central agency, the Custodian Council.46 The board could 
refer the authority to an appointed custodian, for instance a doctor, 
teacher or church person, or to the one of the parents not at fault. This 
legal-administrative model was chosen rather than child judges or 
child courts, the notion being that the local boards were endowed with 
natural conditions for acting on the basis of personal knowledge of the 
relevant parents and children.47 In 1933, the legislation was compiled 
into a comprehensive complex of social law, the precursor of the uni-
versal, tax-financed and rights-based system that was to be developed 
by the end of the 20th century. The custodian boards were turned into 
municipal sub-boards consisting of local politicians, if necessary joined 
by child experts supervised by a new State Inspectorate.48 By the end of 
the 50s and the beginning of the 60s a new perception of children and 
parents, focusing on support, counselling and cooperation as opposed 
to control and on society as opposed to the individual was incorporated 
in the legislation. In 1964, the provision on the public obligation to 
supervise children and families was no longer limited to special groups 
such as single, unmarried mothers or children with disabilities, but now 
potentially targeted all children and families in need of - or at risk of 
needing - support. This approach, expressed in the broad, encompass-
ing public obligation towards children and families was upheld with the 
reform of 1976, tightly connected to the reform and reduction of the 
municipalities that entered into force in 1970. The holistic approach 
entailed substantive changes in the perception of services: The public 
custodian became a personal consultant; voluntary measures were to be 
preferred, parental orders were no longer sanctioned, and non-consen-
sual measures were referred to the social municipal board, dealing also 
with other social matters. However, this optimistic, holistic view on the 
role of the welfare authorities came to be criticized legally, and in 1982 
the Act was amended, so that the social board was supplemented by a 
judge and a child expert in cases of upholding a non-consensual out-
46 Værgerådet.
47 Bryderup, I (2005) p. 41.
48 Folketingets forhandlinger ft. Tillæg A 33 sp. 890 (Parliamentary proceedings).
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of-home placement for more than one year, and in case of preliminary 
decisions. In 1984, such procedural demands were placed also on deci-
sions of discontinued contact. Even though the regional counties were 
intended to support municipal decision-making, a stronger legal focus 
was deemed appropriate to counter local considerations. From 1989 
the central regulation of the municipalities’ organization was softened, 
and a new construction of legal authority in child protection came into 
being. Although it was originally intended to cover the municipal tasks 
in relation to children and families in general, it was later delimitated 
to non-consensual decisions on investigations, out-of-home-placement 
and contact. This regulation was changed in 1994, following the work of 
a commission49 that had been established to point at solutions to proce-
durally strike the balance between family service and child protection in 
local decision-making and between local policies, state regulation and 
the role of the judicial system. The amendments, which were also influ-
enced by the Danish ratification of the crc, led to the existing children 
and young persons’ committee.
This legal construction of child welfare authorities mediates between 
the purpose-rational basis of lay municipal administration and the 
legal-rational basis of state regulation, and between family service and 
child protection. The relations between these positions are dynamic, 
and during the last decades a large amount of reforms have led to 
various changes, aiming at more unified organizational structures 
and political accountability by stipulating obligatory procedures and 
substantial criteria. Particularly, a focus on reporting and monitoring 
measures has been seen through obligations of the municipalities to 
report to central databases and statistics and to implement various 
digital techniques. Furthermore, information campaigns have been 
launched on the possibility to report to the National Appeals Board if 
the municipality fails to fulfil its obligations for instance by not under-
taking the necessary investigations or failing to prepare action plans, to 
conduct consultations or to take into account the best interests of the 
child when making a decision on the choice of a placement facility. The 
National Appeals Board in these cases is authorized to revoke municipal 
49 Graversen, J., & Sejr, L. (1990).
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decisions. Subsequently, the construction and competence of the chil-
dren and young persons’ committees have been subject to changes. The 
municipalities have become obliged to put forward for the committee’s 
approval not only decisions of refusing parents’ permission to take home 
their children from out-of-home placement, but also municipal deci-
sions to give home children from out-of-home placement. Furthermore, 
a new amendment expands the committee’s competence in questions of 
placement and contact where a case has involved abuse.50 The changes 
thus include on the one hand a decrease of the traditional high degree of 
autonomy of the Danish municipal administration, which has been seen 
as leaving a (too) considerable room for local differences. On the other 
hand, the authority to make decisions, and to be the gatekeeper of access 
to the children and young persons’ committees, and thus to the courts, 
still rest with the municipalities, who are seen as effective and cheap as 
opposed to state administration, and the range of measures available to 
the municipalities without parental consent has broadened. As such the 
public interest in children, families and parenthood has increased rather 
dramatically.
These changes of child welfare law and authorities have in the litera-
ture on comparative welfare systems been seen as a movement towards a 
more child-orientated view, from lay to expert administration, and from 
local politics to general regulation.51 It has been described as a general 
move of national systems during the last decade from being either child 
protection or family service oriented towards a more broad child welfare 
perspective, building on both child protection (for instance state-based 
judicial procedures and review) and family service (local consulting 
services etc.) at the same time—in the form of child development. The 
third approach—the child development or welfare perspective—is a 
holistic perspective, integrating both child protection and family service 
and potentially targeting all children. It incorporates the child’s rights 
to two parents and the child’s right to welfare. Thus, the third approach 
emphasizes the public interest in promoting the development of the 
child, and as such it is—like the changes in family law—adaptive and 
50 Lov nr. 496 af 21. 05.2013 om ændring af lov om social service.
51 Gilbert, N. (2012).
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interdependent in relation to the individualization of the family. The 
dynamic relation between state and municipality forms part of this 
growing public interest in that it represents a more direct relationship 
between state and child and a more ambitious welfare agenda, where 
the family becomes a less private unit and parenthood a less private 
task. The approach can be related to many factors—the emergence of 
new theoretical perspectives on children,52 new welfare dynamics and 
technologies, changes of power structures, and the development of the 
competitive state, moving from objectives of social protection against 
vagaries of the market economy toward social activation and inclusion, 
which seek to enable citizens to be responsible and productive human 
capital. In Denmark, the changes in welfare law have been driven par-
ticularly by an overwhelming amount of media-exposed cases of gross 
child abuse and neglect, an internationally oriented focus on child pro-
tection, and competitive demands on society towards the upbringing 
of children. 
5. The changes in family law and child welfare law 
and authorities – coherence and the private/public 
divide in Denmark
The change in the balance of private and public interests as mirrored 
in both private and public law is radical. Family law is now designed to 
uphold general, individual rights, and child welfare law is designed to 
address needs of potentially all children. Both fields have ambitiously 
gone beyond the family as a legal category. As such the development 
within both legal fields can be seen as adapting to general societal 
developments of individualized perceptions of family, parenthood and 
children. This development has turned child welfare into substantive 
law in both legal fields,53 and as such the development represents a 
general and more thorough legal engagement with the child. Whereas 
the development could have been expected to establish a connection 
52 Warming, H. (2011).
53 Foraeldreansvarsloven section 4 and Serviceloven section 19.
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between law as well as authorities in the two fields, this has not been the 
case.  In a way both systems have adapted to the individualization – but 
more or less independently.
Thus, the child welfare administration is still rather strictly separated 
from the State Administration, and earlier conceptualizations—such 
as family service, child protection and parental authority—are kept in 
the respective institutional framework, while new and more common 
concepts—such as the child’s perspective, involvement and child devel-
opment—are incrementally and differently integrated in the respective 
parts of the regulation. The problem being that the new concepts may 
indeed interfere with the earlier ones and put demands on the consis-
tency and coherence of the regulation—and not just supplement it in the 
respective fields.
The demands for coherence, entailed by the development, is illustrat-
ed by the current roles of law and authorities: The family law authorities 
are on the one hand expected to offer advice to parents on the welfare 
of their children and, when necessary, to make decisions in the best 
interests of the child. On the other hand, the family law authorities are 
not exactly responsible for these decisions. These are either made by the 
parents themselves, or by the authorities but without the responsibility 
to fulfil them—this is the responsibility of the parents (and, if necessary, 
the child welfare authorities). And while the child welfare authorities 
are on the one hand legally committed to a more holistic understanding 
of the best interests of the child than the family law authorities, they 
may nonetheless find themselves bound by the private law understand-
ing of the best interests; the child’s right to two parents, depending 
on the family law authority to sanction the approach. Thus, the child 
welfare authorities are limited in their work by the normality as defined 
by family law. More specifically; the child welfare authorities are obliged 
to respect a decision concerning joint custody and of contact made by 
the family law authorities (if the child is not placed out of the home) 
and have to work with two parents holding parental authority. They 
may try to make the parents agree on another arrangement or they may 
help one of the parents with an application to the family law authority. 
Both options may, however, prove to be non-productive. The parents 
may not be able to agree to another arrangement and/or the family law 
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authority might reject a renewed application. A new case may further 
worsen the child’s circumstances due to increased conflict and therefore 
not be worth it. This means that the child welfare authorities may work 
with a family law framework of the child that they—with a more holistic 
understanding of the best interests of the child—do not believe is in 
the best interests of the child.54 The problem can be further illustrated 
by the debate on the Danish cases leading to legislative reform of child 
protection law. The cases are uniformly seen as the result of lack of 
investigation, unsatisfying case-management, and lack of cooperation—
in the municipalities. The role of the State Administration has not been 
touched upon by the media, audits and judicial reviews even though 
many of the cases also contain family law issues of custody and con-
tact. Neither have cases of children being killed by their father during 
contact raised such questions. Thus, the coverage of the cases revolves 
around the municipalities’ handling of the cases, rather than around 
the rationales of the two differing rationales and the interplay between 
them. In the relationship between the two authorities, the family law 
authorities may thus be understood as the most powerful institution 
because it operates within private law and thus has the advantage of 
seeing the parents as more self-dependant. Therefore, the family law 
authorities are in the position to follow a narrow definition of the best 
interests of the child, understood as the child’s right to two parents and 
blame the parents (or the child welfare authorities) if the child is not 
well. One may say that the family law produces differentiated normal-
ity in society through family law decisions, leaving families who cannot 
live up to this family law normality to the role of clients of the public 
law authorities. Thus, the individualization of the family may involve 
that normality has a stronger impact on social welfare law than before.55 
Normality in family law can then be seen as representing parents who 
are competent as parents, and accordingly stigmatize the non-normal 
54 This conflict is spelled out in tfa2013.198 (V2012.B-0057-12) where the municipal-
ity reacts to the courts referral of custody to the father by placing the children out of 
the home with the purpose of protection against allegations of abuse from the father.
55 See Arvidsson, M.B. (2011) who in a Swedish context describes the dilemmas that 
follows from the pre-understanding in social welfare law as partly based on an under-
standing of the family as typical and partly not-typical.
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parents of child welfare – characterized by mental disorders, addiction, 
violence, stalking etc.
Thus, the continuing division and lack of coherence of family law 
and welfare law and of the workings of the respective authorities raise 
a number of questions. One question is how the legal order on the one 
hand can operate with a broad view of child development and on the 
other hand with a narrow definition of the best interests of the child 
sustaining the parents’ individual rights? Another question is how a pre-
understanding of parents in conflict can be combined with the require-
ment in child welfare law of consent from both parents in relation to 
measures to support the child - while on the other hand in family law 
similar decisions are referred to the resident parent? A third question is 
that of child involvement – how can the regulation be so different when 
it all comes down to child welfare and development?
These questions call for answers in the form of a closer alignment of 
the two fields, based on a common child development perspective. Not 
only as regards cooperation between authorities, but also as regards 
definition and use of concepts and delimitations. Examples of coun-
terproductive differences are the lack of recognition of the authority 
of the residential parent in child welfare law, the lack of recognition of 
the need for supervision and investigation in family law and the lack of 
common principles for child involvement in the two fields.
The problems entailed by the lack of coherence have been pointed at 
in the last evaluation of the Danish Act on Parental Authority, where 
the child welfare authorities expressed the view that the act was a hin-
drance to child welfare work.56 Parents and children find themselves lost 
between the private and the public law authorities. The parents are too 
caught in their conflict to be able to gain from the efforts of private law 
authorities, and the child is often not miserable enough to get help from 
the public law authorities.
However, not much attention has been directed towards the inter-
action between family law and child welfare law. In Denmark, the 
intersection between the two areas has only been addressed in relation 
to specific points of interests even though the changes in reality signi-
56 http://www.kl.dk/ImageVault/Images/id_55789/scope_0/ImageVaultHandler.aspx
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fies a move towards a more broad and general child welfare perspective, 
covering the municipal as well as the state administration. As such, the 
relation between the two areas of law and their different rationales are 
addressed, but in a blurred and incremental way. In the latest reform 
of the Danish Social Services Act the preparatory documents mention 
that municipal action plans addressing abuse should involve the State 
Administration (yet the State Administration is not included in the 
sections allowing for cross-sectorial cooperation)57. In the Parental 
Authority Act it has only recently been stipulated that the municipalities 
are the competent authorities in matters of contact during out-of-home 
placement.58 Another incremental adaptation is that legal guidelines 
have recently emphasized the mandatory reporting obligation of the 
State Administration59, and that the State Administration may collect 
information from other authorities including the municipalities. There 
have also been initiatives to instigate cooperation and communication 
between the municipalities and State Administration.60 These reforms 
and changes have been dealt with separately, and they are careful not 
to address the narrow interpretation of the best interest of the child in 
private law and the understanding of parents as mainly autonomous vis 
á vis the public law understanding of the parents as subjected to a more 
holistic understanding of the best interests of the child. 
This carefulness not to touch the private-public law divide and the 
inconsistencies stemming from it implies a legal design more preoc-
cupied with traditional divisions of power and positions than with an 
interest in the reality of the people it is aimed at. The shift from an ideal 
of marriage to individual rights and welfare implies that it does not 
make sense anymore to presuppose family harmony (as in the former 
marriage law). Parental authority as the private law framework of the 
family no longer mirrors a pre-existing societal family unit to which 
the best interests of the child may be attributed. Instead, it mirrors the 
57 Sections 49a, 49 b, 50b.
58 Foraeldreansvarsloven, section 24.
59 Vejledning nr. 9297 af  25.06.2013 om samvær.
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rights of the individual child, and therefore welfare must be understood 
with the child as the starting point. A child as a human being - and a 
more vulnerable one than a grown-up - is different from marriage as a 
societal institution. Notwithstanding this, within family law parents are 
taught that it is their own responsibility to live and find harmony within 
the framework, created by the state. What is ignored in a private law 
perspective is that the individual parent may have no options of ensur-
ing the child’s welfare because of the other parents’ individual rights, 
held up by the legal framework, and harmony may be out of reach. The 
best interests of the child as understood in child welfare law is more in 
line with the new understanding of parenthood because child welfare 
law is centered on a holistic investigation of the child’s living circum-
stances,  its subjective understanding of its situation, and authority to 
act without parental consent.
Unfortunately, the challenges seem hard to overcome. Family law as 
private law takes its starting point in majority norms and thus produces 
normality while child welfare law as public law takes its starting point 
in situations deviating from the norms of mainstream society – such as 
domestic violence, abuse, crime etc. These different rationales of the 
two legal fields and the authorities connected to them make it difficult 
to obtain a higher degree of legal coherence since the societal interest in 
the production of normality seems to entail subordinating child welfare 
law under the rationale of family law. This may also explain the media’s 
and reviewers’ focus on the doings of child welfare authorities in tragic 
cases while the family law authorities’ responsibility is not discussed.
6. Scandinavian family law and child welfare authorities—a tentative 
comparison
The distinction between public and private law authorities can be 
identified in all three Scandinavian countries even though the structure 
of the authorities is quite different in the three countries. In family law 
matters, the competent authority in both Sweden and Norway is the 
ordinary court, since the cases in Norway were moved from the State 
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Administration in 2004.61 In Norway, the child welfare authorities gen-
erally are not integrated in the family law procedure.62 The same is the 
case in Denmark.63 In Sweden, however, the family law procedure of the 
court involves the municipalities in that they have the authority to act in 
family law conflicts in different manners, they are responsible for inves-
tigation of some cases, they may initiate a family law procedure and they 
have to approve on some family law agreements between the parents.64 
As for child welfare cases, these were in Norway moved from the 
municipalities65 to regional state administrative authorities66 in 2004.67 
In Sweden,68 child welfare is still—like in Denmark—the responsibility 
of the municipalities, but conflicts are decided by ordinary courts and 
administrative courts, whereas the Danish model is more of an admin-
istrative nature. 
These different approaches can to a large extend be explained histori-
cally. Denmark has the greatest legacy to the former autocracy which 
explains the authority of the State Administration in family law matters. 
In child welfare matters, Norway has chosen a State model69 that deviates 
from the Danish and Swedish way of addressing critique of municipal 
child welfare authority. Namely by amending the legal framework and 
increase state coordination and monitoring. One explanation for this 
might be that neither Sweden nor Denmark has en bloc-implemented 
the crc, as opposed to Norway’s full implementation. The Norwegian 
strategy of state administration in child welfare as well as family law 
can be understood as the result of a more direct state commitment to 
compliance with the crc, i.e. an unwillingness to let compliance be 
dependent on local or administrative authorities, adhering also to dif-
fering, local or administrative rationales.
61 Dyring, J. (forthcoming) (unpublished phd. thesis p. 209).
62 See a critical view; Breivik. F.L. and K. Mevik (2012).
63 See a critical view; Kronborg, A. (2011).
64 Schiratzki, J. (2010) p. 18.
65 »Fylkeskommunerne».
66 »Fylkesnemnda».
67 Ot.prp.nr. 9 (2002—2003), cf. Lindboe (2011) p. 17.
68 Mattsson, T. (2010).
69 Lindboe, K. (2011).
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The different approaches have implications for the division of private 
and public law. As for the public /private law divide, the Norwegian 
court procedure of family law seem to be rather sharply delimitated from 
the child welfare proceedings of the regional state administrations. This 
resembles the strict divide between the Danish State Administration of 
family law and the Danish municipal child welfare administration. The 
division between public family law and child welfare law in Norway is 
thus described as radical in recent literature similar to Danish law70. In 
Sweden, however, the division seem to be more soft-in that the munici-
palities interact more directly with the family law court procedure. 
Thus, the divide seems to be most profound in Norway and Denmark 
and smallest in Sweden at least on the legislative level but this may look 
different on a case level. 
The divide is touched upon in later reforms in the Scandinavian 
countries. In Norwegian law a recent reform has addressed the interplay 
between family law and child welfare law.71 Contact may be conditioned 
by different types of supervision by the public law authorities and they 
are allowed to exchange information with the private law authorities 
(the court). In Sweden, the thorough report delivered in 200972 by the 
commission assigned to draft new child welfare regulation recommend-
ed to holistically re-think the legislative complex from a child welfare 
(and user-oriented) perspective and thus softening the public/private 
law divide. It has, however, only led to minor changes.
7. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
The crc committee has not critically addressed our specific focus in 
Denmark but has been understood as a matter of coordination. In the 
concluding observations on Denmark from 2005, the interplay between 
the national authorities and the municipalities is mentioned. The evalu-
ation from 2005 states:
70 See footnote 62.
71 Lov 2013-06-21 nr. 62: Lov om endringer i barnelova.
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Coordination
11. The Committee welcomes the establishment of the Ministry of Families 
and Consumer Affairs charged with the task to coordinate the implementation 
of the Convention and notes the role of the ad-hoc inter-ministerial commit-
tees for thematic coordination and the fact that municipalities have to develop 
in the course of 2006 coherent child policies.
However, the Committee is concerned that it is still unclear how a compre-
hensive coordination at the national and between the national and local level 
will be established.
12. The Committee recommends that the State party strengthen the ability of 
the Ministry of Family and Consumer Affairs to effectively coordinate all poli-
cies of the State party to ensure a comprehensive and effective implementation 
of the Convention throughout the country.
In the next evaluation from 2011 a follow up on coordination was 
seen as unsatisfying. The perception of the institutional framework 
is not basically questioned at the international level. The committee’s 
comments can be said to illustrate the hesitation of the committee to 
engage in the institutional framework of the jurisdictions by avoiding to 
address the issue of separation of state administration and municipali-
ties and whether this is a relevant and sensible legal design from a child 
welfare perspective. This is easy to understand if we look at the general 
history of law. In the period where legal philosophy was focused on the 
creation of the national states and the rights of the citizens ensured by 
the specific national order, the political community and the citizen’s 
rights were part of the same story: »A traditional political order, 
based on a specific community, generates inalienable rights, long-term 
commitments and obligations that bind together the participants of a 
community.»73 The human rights agenda in the 20th century focuses 
not on the citizen but on the human being, and does not have a political 
order similar to that of natural law, due to the lack of a global political 
community and community-based institutions. As such, institutions 
73 Baumann, Z. (2001) cited by Banakar (2013)
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are of a traditional, national character, and must be presupposed rather 
than addressed by the human rights agenda.
By taking the coordination approach the committee can presup-
pose the existing national institutions and thus embrace the national 
political order and authorities, and at the same time endorse the broader 
global human rights agenda. This hesitant approach however may just 
reproduce the tensions between family law and child welfare law on the 
agency level in the member states. In the human right discourse, ten-
sions may be hidden in the reflection of the international society which 
is one in progress. The ratio is that in the future, the national authorities 
will act together to serve the best interests of the child. This is an easy 
way of course to focus on the distance in time and focus on a future 
where the national authorities act together to serve the best interests of 
the child.74 Thus, the interplay is understood as a principle more than 
practice. The institutional construction of crc suits this understand-
ing since the committee’s critic of the nation points to future national 
development. Furthermore, the generalized critic does not sound politi-
cally serious and may not be something that the state needs to act on 
immediately.
74 On rationality at a distance in time and space, see Brunsson, N. (2002) p. 197 ff.
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